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EVIDENCE
I. DNA PRINT IDENTIFICATION Is ADMISSIBLE IN JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
In State v. Ford' the South Carolina Supreme Court decided the
novel issue of whether deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) print identifica-
tion is admissible into evidence in judicial proceedings in South Caro-
lina. The court held that the trial court properly allowed the DNA
analysis into evidence. Further, the court noted that in future cases
DNA analysis may be admitted into evidence in the same manner as
other scientific methods routinely used in trials.
2
Stacy Ford appealed his conviction for conspiracy, kidnapping,
and criminal sexual conduct. In preparation for Ford's trial the state
sent three vials of blood, a vaginal swab, and a clothing patch from the
victim's underwear to a biotechnology corporation for DNA analysis.
Over the objection of the defense, the trial judge admitted testimony
concerning the results of the DNA analysis. On appeal Ford argued
that the trial judge should not have admitted this evidence.
After a brief description of DNA print analysis, the court dis-
cussed the test to be applied in determining the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence. Ford argued that DNA analysis failed to satisfy the test
articulated in Frye v. United States.3 Under the Frye standard a court
will not admit the results from a scientific technique unless the tech-
nique is "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs."' 4 The court noted that South
Carolina has never explicitly adopted the Frye standard." Instead, the
less restrictive standard established in State v. Jones6 guides courts in
this state.7 In Jones the South Carolina Supreme Court found that the
admissibility of scientific evidence depends upon "'the degree to which
the trier of fact must accept, on faith, scientific hypotheses not capable
of proof or disproof in court and not even generally accepted outside
the courtroom.' ,,
1. 301 S.C. 485, 392 S.E.2d 781 (1990).
2. Id. at 490, 392 S.E.2d at 784.
3. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. Id. at 1014.
5. Ford, 301 S.C. at 488, 392 S.E.2d at 783.
6. 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979).
7. Ford, 301 S.C. at 488, 392 S.E.2d at 783.
8. Jones, 273 S.C. at 731, 259 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App.
1
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After reviewing the testimony concerning DNA analysis, the Ford
court concluded that the trial judge properly admitted the results of
the DNA analysis under both the Jones and Frye tests.9 The court
found that the scientific community has generally accepted DNA anal-
ysis1" and noted that other jurisdictions have admitted the results of
the procedure." Recognizing that "the use of DNA analysis in forensic
settings is a recent development," the court ruled that the reliability of
a particular test would remain subject to attack under traditional evi-
dentiary challenges.1 2 However, courts can separate the issue of relia-
bility, which relates to the weight of the evidence, from the initial
question of admissibility. 3 The court held, therefore, that after its de-
cision a Frye-type hearing will not be necessary because the prosecu-
tion already will have satisfied the initial test for admissibility.
1 4
DNA print analysis is a relatively new technique, which first ap-
peared in the United States in 1987.15 The question of the admissibil-
ity of the procedure's results only recently has begun to reach the ap-
pellate courts. Most of the controversy surrounding this issue concerns
the proper roles of the trial judge and jury in deciding the reliability of
the results of this new scientific technique. The significance of Ford
turns not on whether South Carolina courts are to apply the Jones or
the Frye standard, but on whether the reliability of a particular DNA
test is a question concerning the admissibility or the weight of the
evidence.
The Ford court decided that issues pertaining to the procedures
used in a particular DNA print test relate to the weight, rather than
the admissibility, of the evidence.' 6 Other courts are in accordance.'
1
Some courts have been more wary in admitting the results without a
finding concerning the application of the DNA analysis to the particu-
3d 100, 110, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355-56 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975)), quoted in Ford, 301 S.C. at
488, 392 S.E.2d at 783.
9. Ford, 301 S.C. at 490, 392 S.E.2d at 784.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 489, 392 S.E.2d at 783.
12. Id. For example, the challenger may attack the relevancy or prejudicial effect of
the test. Id. at 490, 392 S.E.2d at 784.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Pearsall, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77
CALnr. L. R.v. 665, 666 (1989).
16. Ford, 301 S.C. at 490, 392 S.E.2d at 784.
17. See, e.g., State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 101, 393 S.E.2d 847, 854 (1990)
(citing Ford, 301 S.C. at 490, 392 S.E.2d at 784); Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579, 584
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that "[o]nce a scientific technique is sufficiently estab-
lished, its proper application on a particular occasion becomes merely a question for the
jury").
1991]
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lar facts of the case under consideration.1
The question of whether to admit the results of novel scientific
techniques into evidence involves a careful balancing of conflicting in-
terests. One criticism of the Frye approach, which fosters pretrial hear-
ings and focuses evidentiary issues on questions of admissibility rather
than weight, is that it creates "a 'cultural lag' between the develop-
ment and the acceptance of new techniques.""' "This delay, according
to critics, deprives the courts of reliable evidence. '20 Another criticism
of placing stringent requirements on the admissibility of the results of
new scientific techniques is that such an approach is inconsistent with
modern evidence codes, which give the trier of fact a broad range of
discretion.
2
2
Against these concerns courts must balance the compelling inter-
est of avoiding inaccurate test results that convince a jury to convict an
innocent person. It may be premature for courts to hold that DNA
analysis is generally admissible into evidence before the companies
performing these tests have demonstrated their proficiency with a high
degree of certainty.22 Concern exists that the complexity of the proce-
dures in DNA analysis will cause juries to accept what they do not
understand.2a Perhaps if there must be a choice between these inter-
ests, constitutional concerns mandate that the accused be favored.
MacLean Limehouse
II. CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY
STRENGTHENED
In State v. Myers24 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
the trial court erred in disqualifying the defense's expert witness. The
18. See Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 286-87, 393 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1990) (conclud-
ing that challenges of the results of DNA identification techniques implicate issues of
admissibility as well as weight); People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 979, 545 N.Y.S.2d
985, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (concluding that trial judges should hold pretrial hearings "to
determine if the testing laboratory [conducting the DNA print analysis] substantially
performed the scientifically accepted tests and techniques, yielding sufficiently reliable
results to be admissible as a question of fact for the jury").
19. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic
Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. Rlv. 45, 54 (1989).
20. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUm L. REv. 1197, 1223 (1980).
21. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review denied,
542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989).
22. Thompson & Ford, supra note 19, at 107-08.
23. Pearsall, supra note 15, at 688.
24. 301 S.C. 251, 391 S.E.2d 551 (1990).
[Vol. 43
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court found the error prejudicial to the defendants, reversed the volun-
tary manslaughter convictions, and remanded the case.25 This decision
should strengthen the availability of expert testimony to criminal de-
fendants and reinforce the parallels between the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and the South Carolina evidentiary standard for the qualifica-
tion of expert witnesses.
26
Myers involved a man killed by his wife and son. The victim had
been beaten about the head and legs with a baseball bat and a brass
duck figurine. The testimony at trial showed that the victim had a long
history of abuse toward his family. Both defendants pleaded self-
defense.
2 7
The defense presented Ms. Koelpin, a forensic science investiga-
tor, to testify on the blood spatter patterns around the victim. Al-
though Ms. Koelpin had been at approximately one hundred forensic
crime scenes and had performed over one thousand autopsies, she had
never before testified in court on blood spatter patterns. In 1985 she
attended a one-week seminar on the characteristics of blood stains.
The trial judge found this experience insufficient to qualify her as an
expert on blood pattern interpretations and did not allow her to
testify.
2
During closing arguments the state offered blood pattern interpre-
tations to the jury. Noting that the solicitor's opinions aggravated the
disqualification of the defense's expert, the supreme court wrote, "The
jury was deprived of this expert information and was instead bom-
barded with the solicitor's nonexpert views and interpretations of the
blood spatters." 29 On appeal the state conceded that blood spatter evi-
dence is a matter for expert opinion because it is outside the knowl-
edge of ordinary jurors.
The qualification of an expert witness is left largely to the discre-
tion of the trial court.30 The supreme court noted, however, that "gen-
25. Id. at 259, 391 S.E.2d at 555.
26. See FED. R. Evm. 702 advisory committee's note ("IT]he expert is [not] viewed
[narrowly] ... . Thus within the scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest
sense of the word . . but also the large group sometimes called 'skilled' witnesses .
. . ."). Three months after the Myers decision South Carolina Criminal Procedure Rule
24, S.C. R. Cans P. 24, became effective. Rule 24 deals with expert testimony and re-
states Rules 702 to 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, FFn. R. Evio. 702-705.
27. Myers, 301 S.C. at 254, 391 S.E.2d at 553.
28. Id. at 255, 391 S.E.2d at 554.
29. Id. at 258, 391 S.E.2d at 555.
30. Id. at 255, 391 S.E.2d at 554 (citing State v. Caldwell, 283 S.C. 350, 322 S.E.2d
662 (1984)); see also MCCORMICK ON EvIDENcE § 13, at 34 (3d ed. 1984) ("[T]he practice
in respect to experts' qualifications has not for the most part crystallized in specific
rules, but is recognized as a matter for the trial judge's discretion reviewable only for
abuse.").
1991]
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erally, defects in the amount and quality of education or experience go
to the weight to be accorded the expert's testimony and not its admis-
sibility."31 The Myers defendants were not allowed to call their expert
to interpret evidence admittedly outside of the jury's experience. The
supreme court therefore found that the trial court's disqualification of
the defense's expert was an abuse of discretion and inhibited the fair-
ness of the trial. Moreover, the solicitor's closing statement on the rea-
sons behind the blood spatters compounded the error, and the supreme
court found the statement "sufficiently prejudicial to make the trial
court's ruling reversible.
'32
The court's reasoning is a logical extension of past decisions. The
South Carolina Supreme Court has held that a witness does not need a
professional degree to qualify as an expert.33 For practical reasons, no
party is required to present the most qualified expert in the particular
field of expertise. As long as the witness has "acquired by study or
practical experience a special knowledge of a subject matter about
which the jury's good judgment and average knowledge is inadequate,"
the court may qualify the witness as an expert. 4 South Carolina courts
have long held that deficiencies in an expert's qualifications do not
necessarily disqualify the witness, but should go to the weight of the
expert's testimony.3 5
The unique aspect of Myers is the supreme court's suggestion that
disqualifying the defense's expert could have constitutional implica-
tions. The court cited California v. Trombetta6 as support for its
statement that the trial judge's "ruling impacted on the fairness of the
Myers' trial."3' 7 In Trombetta the United States Supreme Court dealt
with a defendant's right to access breath samples taken by
breathalyzers. The Court's dicta on fundamental fairness to criminal
defendants is germane to Myers. The Court stated that the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires "that criminal de-
fendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense."38 This constitutional privilege "delivers exculpatory evidence
31. Myers, 301 S.C. at 256, 391 S.E.2d at 554 (citing State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487,
129 S.E.2d 330 (1963)).
32. Id. at 258, 391 S.E.2d at 555.
33. State v. Ham, 256 S.C. 1, 11, 180 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
34. Manning v. City of Columbia, 297 S.C. 451, 454, 377 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1989) (per
curiam) (citing Honea v. Prior, 295 S.C. 526, 369 S.E.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1988)).
35. See, e.g., State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 496, 129 S.E.2d 330, 334-35 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 860 (1964), overruled on other grounds, State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d
315 (S.C. 1991).
36. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
37. State v. Myers, 301 S.C. 251, 256, 391 S.E.2d 551, 554 (1990).
38. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485.
[Vol. 43
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into the hands of the accused, thereby protecting the innocent from
erroneous conviction and ensuring the integrity of our criminal justice
system."8 9
The Myers court's reference to Trombetta suggests that the trial
judge's disqualification of the defense's expert hindered the defend-
ants' constitutional right to present a complete defense. The Myers
court did not elaborate, however, on this point. Instead, it focused on
the solicitor's remarks on the blood spatters.
The solicitor's summation, which focused on the possible causes of
the pattern of blood spatters, was a significant motivation in the rever-
sal; the trial court's error alone probably would not have warranted
reversing the convictions. If the jury had not heard any comments on
the blood stains, it might have simply reached a verdict based on other
evidence, perhaps finding no significance in the pattern of blood stains
around the victim. Significantly, the court held that the prosecution's
unanswered comments on the blood spatters were "sufficiently prejudi-
cial to make the trial court's ruling reversible.'
'40
Reversals for abuse in expert qualifications are rare.," Unlike My-
ers, most of the challenges to witness qualifications in South Carolina
concern the trial court's qualification of the expert.42 Because the ma-
jority of appeals contest the qualification of an expert, as opposed to
an expert's disqualification, it appears that trial courts are prone to
qualify experts. Indeed, most courts seem aware of the policy to in-
struct the jury to weigh the testimony in light of the expert's experi-
ence, instead of merely disqualifying the expert. The danger of ques-
tionable expert testimony is easily averted by jury instructions. If a
court disqualifies a criminal defendant's expert witness, a constitu-
tional issue may arise.43 Accordingly, in criminal trials the court faces a
greater risk of error by disqualifying the defendant's expert than by
qualifying the expert despite flaws in the witness's expertise.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply a strict qualification
standard to experts. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact. . . a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
39. Id.
40. Myers, 301 S.C. at 258, 391 S.E.2d at 555 (footnote omitted).
41. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30.
42. See, e.g., State v. Childs, 299 S.C. 471, 385 S.E.2d 839 (1989); Honea v. Prior,
295 S.C. 526, 369 S.E.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1988).
43. See, e.g., State v. Schmidt, 288 S.C. 301, 303, 342 S.E.2d 401, 402 (1986) ("The
Sixth Amendment rights... guarantee that a criminal charge may be answered through
the calling and interrogation of favorable witnesses .... These basic rights are applica-
ble to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
1991]
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in the form of an opinion or otherwise."'44 The supreme court's decision
in Myers tracks this standard. The standard is not new to South Caro-
lina. Generally, the courts have not mandated that an expert have a
degree or other outside approval to qualify as an expert.45 The supreme
court's reasoning that disqualification of a criminal defendant's expert
may hinder the defendant's constitutional right to present a meaning-
ful defense is, however, a new analysis.
Although Myers may result in an increased judicial tolerance to-
ward a criminal defendant's expert, the case has a somewhat limited
application. Ultimately, the solicitor's closing argument was the cata-
lyst in the reversal. Without those prejudicial statements, the error of
the trial court in disqualifying the expert might not have warranted
reversal. The supreme court specified midway through its opinion that
"in the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that it
was error for the trial judge to refuse to qualify Ms. Koelpin as an
expert."'0 The court did not reverse, however, until the close of its
opinion and after its discussion of the solicitor's discourse on blood
spatter patterns.
47
Bob Deeb
III. COURT EXPANDS PROSECUTION'S ABILITY TO INTRODUCE PRIOR
CONVICTIONS THROUGH EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AGAINST TESTIFYING
DEFENDANT
In State v. Major'8 the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed
two issues that affect the admissibility of prior convictions to impeach
a defendant's testimony. First, the court expressly overruled State v.
Ball 94 and held that "mere possession of cocaine is a crime of moral
turpitude.150 Second, the court held that the defendant's testimony
concerning his involvement with drugs placed his character on that
subject at issue and that the prosecution could therefore introduce the
defendant's plea of guilty to simple possession of cocaine to rebut that
44. FED. R. EvID. 702; see supra note 26.
45. State v. Ham, 256 S.C. 1, 11, 180 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
46. State v. Myers, 301 S.C. 251, 256, 391 S.E.2d 551, 554 (1990).
47. Id. at 259, 391 S.E.2d at 555.
48. 301 S.C. 181, 391 S.E.2d 235 (1990).
49. 292 S.C. 71, 354 S.E.2d 906 (1987).
50. Major, 301 S.C. at 184, 391 S.E.2d at 237. Soon thereafter the court held that
simple possession of heroin is a crime of moral turpitude. See In re Gibson, 302 S.C. 12,
393 S.E.2d 184 (1990) (per curiam).
[Vol. 43
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evidence.51 The court's resolution of both issues enhances the opportu-
nity for the prosecution to introduce a defendant's prior convictions.
"When an accused takes the stand, he becomes subject to im-
peachment, like any other witness. '52 Accordingly, cross-examination
concerning "'past transactions tending to affect his credibility'" is
permissible.5 3 This cross-examination may be supported "by the intro-
duction into evidence of convictions for crimes of moral turpitude,
since they too are past transactions tending to affect credibility."' 5' A
crime of moral turpitude is defined as "'an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the social duties which a man owes to his fellow man or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and man.' ,,55 To determine whether a crime is
one of moral turpitude, "'the Court focuses primarily on the duty to
society and fellow men which is breached by the commission of the
crime.' "se Courts typically do not hold that crimes characterized by
self-destructive behavior involve moral turpitude.
5 7
Prior to Major the supreme court held that simple possession of
marijuana" and simple possession of cocaine5 9 are not crimes of moral
turpitude. The court distinguished convictions for possession of drugs
from convictions for distribution of drugs by finding that only the lat-
ter violated the duty owed to society.60 The court viewed simple pos-
session of controlled substances as self-destructive behavior and not as
a breach of a duty to society in general.6 1
Although the Major court overruled the holding in Ball, it re-
tained and applied the Ball test to determine whether simple posses-
sion of cocaine is a crime of moral turpitude.62 The Major court did
not address its previous distinction between possession and distribu-
tion offenses. Instead, the court stated that "[b]ecause of our present
'war on drugs,' and because any involvement with cocaine contributes
to the destruction of ordered society, we hold that mere possession of
51. Major, 301 S.C. at 186, 391 S.E.2d at 238.
52. Id. at 183, 391 S.E.2d at 237.
53. Id. (quoting State v. Allen, 266 S.C. 468, 482, 224 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1976)).
54. Id. at 184, 391 S.E.2d at 237 (citing Taylor v. State, 258 S.C. 369, 188 S.E.2d
850 (1972)).
55. State v. Harvey, 275 S.C. 225, 227 n.1, 268 S.E.2d 587, 588 n.1 (1980) (quoting
J. MuiLER, HANDBOOK OF CRImiNAL LAw 24 (1934)).
56. Major, 301 S.C. at 184, 391 S.E.2d at 237 (quoting State v. Ball, 292 S.C. 71, 73,
354 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1987)).
57. Id. at 186, 391 S.E.2d at 238 (Finney, J., dissenting).
58. Harvey, 275 S.C. at 277, 268 S.E.2d at 588.
59. Ball, 292 S.C. at 74, 354 S.E.2d at 908.
60. State v. Lilly, 278 S.C. 499, 500, 299 S.E.2d 329, 330 (1983) (per curian).
61. Ball, 292 S.C. at 74, 354 S.E.2d at 908.
62. State v. Major, 301 S.C. 181, 184, 391 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990).
1991]
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cocaine is a crime of moral turpitude."6
Because the decision to overrule Ball was inapplicable to the de-
fendant in Major, the court considered whether it could sustain, on
other grounds, the judge's decision to permit the prosecution to intro-
duce extrinsic evidence during cross-examination to prove Major's pre-
vious conviction for possession of cocaine.6 4 The court held that it
could sustain the judge's decision.
5
At Major's trial a police officer testified that he met with the de-
fendant several times in the "Quarters," an area of Olanta, South Car-
olina that the police had targeted for an undercover drug operation. At
one meeting the defendant allegedly sold the officer some "rock" co-
caine for twenty-five dollars. The officer "testified that he was face-to-
face with the [defendant] and was positive that he had identified the
right individual.
'66
Major took the stand in his own defense. He testified that he had
never seen the officer before and was with his sister when the alleged
crime occurred. On cross-examination Major stated that he had "noth-
ing to do" with the selling of crack cocaine in the "Quarters. '67 Fur-
thermore, when asked on direct examination whether he sold drugs to
the officer, "Major answered, '[n]o sir' and then volunteered 'I do not
sell drugs.' ,,6s
The court found "that this unresponsive answer, coupled with Ma-
jor's other testimony, was a clear attempt by Major to communicate to
the jury that he is not the sort of individual who would become in-
volved in the drug trade."6 Thus, Major had "introduced evidence of
his own good character on the issue of involvement in drugs." ° The
court then concluded that it was permissible for the prosecution to in-
troduce the defendant's guilty plea to possession of cocaine to rebut
this evidence of good character.
71
The effect of the Major decision on the introduction of character
evidence is important for two reasons. First, it shows the ease with
63. Id. The court's subsequent holding in State v. Bolden, 398 S.E.2d 494 (S.C.
1990), limits, however, the application of the broad based "war on drugs" rationale ar-
ticulated in Major. In Bolden the court reaflirmed State v. Harvey, 275 S.C. 225, 268
S.E.2d 587, and held that simple possession of marijuana is not a crime of moral turpi-
tude. 398 S.E.2d at 495. The court distinguished Harvey from Major by finding that the
possession of marijuana is an "offense of lesser culpability." Id.
64. Major, 301 S.C. at 185, 391 S.E.2d at 238.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 183, 391 S.E.2d at 237.
67. Id. at 185, 391 S.E.2d at 238.
68. Id. (alteration by court).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 186, 391 S.E.2d at 238.
71. Id.
[Vol. 43
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which defendants may place their character at issue through their own
testimony by giving answers that go beyond the scope of the question
asked. Second, the court set forth a rule that permits the introduction
of prior convictions proved by extrinsic evidence to rebut the character
evidence offered by the defendant.
In State v. Gibert72 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that if
the defendant introduces evidence of good character and then takes
the stand, the state may cross-examine the defendant with respect "to
particular acts which manifestly bear reference to the trait of character
covered by the charge in the indictment." 3 However, the Gibert court
limited the prosecution's inquiry by holding that the prosecution could
not contradict the defendant's answers during cross-examination. 4
In Major the court stated that "[w]hen the accused offers evidence
of his good character regarding specific character traits relevant to the
crime charged, the solicitor has the right to cross-examine him as to
particular bad acts or conduct"7 5 related to the character trait "focused
on by the accused.' '7 6 The court noted that the rule governing the in-
troduction of evidence in this situation is the same as the rule gov-
erning the introduction of evidence to impeach the credibility of a wit-
ness.77 The court then stated the types of evidence the prosecution
may introduce during the cross-examination of the accused to rebut
the character evidence presented by the defendant: "(1) [P]rior bad
acts, not the subject of a conviction, which may be inquired about, but
for which the answer of the accused must be taken; and (2) prior con-
victions, which may be proven by extrinsic evidence.
'78
The court's holding is an important extension of the Gibert rule
because it explicitly allows the prosecution to introduce evidence of
prior convictions during the cross-examination of a defendant who has
offered evidence of his good character. The decision in Major allows
the prosecution to go beyond merely asking the defendant about prior
bad acts during cross-examination and permits the prosecution to in-
troduce extrinsic evidence to prove those acts when they result in a
72. 196 S.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 451 (1941).
73. Id. at 309, 13 S.E.2d at 453.
74. Id.
75. Major, 301 S.C. at 185, 391 S.E.2d at 238 (citing State v. Aluen, 266 S.C. 468,
224 S.E.2d 881 (1976); State v. Gibert, 196 S.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 451 (1941)).
76. Id. (citing 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 820 (1989)).
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Allen, 266 S.C. at 482-83, 224 S.E.2d at 886).
1991]
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conviction.7
9
Roy L. Rowe, Jr.
IV. INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL CONVICTIONS TO PROVE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN SENTENCING PHASE OF MURDER TRIAL
BARRED
In State v. Riddle"0 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
the admission into evidence of the defendant's burglary and armed
robbery convictions without proper jury instructions on the elements
of those crimes during the resentencing phase of the defendant's mur-
der trial was reversible error."1 The court distinguished between the
introduction of evidence of aggravating circumstances and the'intro-
duction of convictions of aggravating crimes and reasoned that the in-
troduction of convictions usurped the function of the sentencing jury
by allowing it to adopt the convicting jury's finding that aggravating
crimes were committed. 2 By barring the introduction of convictions to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt crimes that constitute statutory ag-
gravating circumstances, the court added to the heavy burden the state
must bear when it attempts to have a murderer sentenced to death.
Ernest Riddle was convicted of the murder, burglary, and armed
robbery of Abbie Sue Mullinax. He was sentenced to death for murder,
to life imprisonment for burglary, and to a twenty-five year prison sen-
tence for armed robbery. The supreme court affirmed the convictions,
but reversed the death sentence and remanded for resentencing be-
cause of judicial error in admitting evidence during the sentencing
phase of the trial.8 3 On remand the judge permitted the state to intro-
duce the defendant's burglary and armed robbery convictions to prove
79. Id. at 186, 391 S.E.2d at 238.
80. 301 S.C. 68, 389 S.E.2d 665 (1990) [hereinafter Riddle I1].
81. Id. at 71-72, 389 S.E.2d 667. South Carolina requires by statute a bifurcated
conviction and sentencing proceeding in capital cases. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990). When a court convicts a defendant of murder, it must conduct a
separate sentencing trial, at which the jury hears and weighs evidence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and recommends either a sentence of death or life imprison-
ment. Id. § 16-3-20(C). The court may sentence a defendant to death only when the jury
finds statutory aggravating circumstances and recommends a death sentence. Id.
82. Riddle II, 301 S.C. at 71, 389 S.E.2d at 667.
83. State v. Riddle, 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E.2d 138 (1987) (per curiam) [hereinafter
Riddle ], overruled on other grounds, State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991). The
supreme court held that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding the de-
fendant's expert from testifying that the defendant would adapt to prison life and by
permitting the state to introduce the defendant's juvenile record without prior notifica-
tion to the defendant. Id. at 235-37, 353 S.E.2d at 140-41.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed murder
under aggravating circumstances. 84 Riddle was resentenced to death.
Riddle again appealed his sentence and the supreme court re-
versed and remanded for resentencing. The court stated that admis-
sion of the burglary and armed robbery convictions from the guilt
phase in the resentencing phase of a capital murder case to prove stat-
utory aggravating circumstances was reversible error.85
The court looked to the legislative purpose behind the require-
ment that the murder be accompanied by aggravating circumstances in
order to sustain a sentence of death. The court found that the
"[a]ggravating circumstances serve to guide and limit the sentencing
authority's discretion so as to reduce the likelihood that [a death] sen-
tence will be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner."," The
court stated that the "'channelling and limiting of the sentencer's dis-
cretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamentally constitutional
requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action.' ",87
The court further stated that "[tihis discretion must not be af-
fected by 'state-induced suggestions that the sentencing jury may shift
[to the convicting jury] its responsibility' for determining whether
death is the appropriate punishment in a particular case."88 The court
noted that the defendant's burglary and armed robbery convictions
were not binding upon the resentencing jury. The court reasoned that
the introduction of the convictions "injected an unreliable factor into
the resentencing which subverted the jury's responsibility to find the
existence, or not, of a statutory aggravating circumstance."8' 9
84. Riddle 11, 301 S.C. at 69, 389 S.E.2d at 666. At Riddle's resentencing trial the
solicitor argued to the jury that aggravating circumstances were proved by the introduc-
tion of Riddle's prior convictions. The solicitor told the jury that the state had "proved
those aggravating circumstances beyond any reasonable doubt to you. They are there in
the public records." Id. at 70, 389 S.E.2d at 666.
85. Id. at 71-72, 389 S.E.2d at 667.
86. Id. at 70, 389 S.E.2d at 666 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); State
v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 957 (1979)).
87. Id. at 71, 389 S.E.2d at 666 (quoting Maryland v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362
(1988)).
88. Id., 389 S.E.2d at 666-67 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330
(1985)).
89. Id., 389 S.E.2d at 667. Section 16-3-20(C) of the South Carolina Code, S.C.
CODE AN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), precludes the imposition of the death
penalty unless the sentencing authority concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that at
least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists. Riddle II, 301 S.C. at 70, 389 S.E.2d
at 666. The court stated that "[tihis requirement applies to those trials in which the
same jury determines guilt in phase I, then imposes sentence in phase H. [The require-
ment] applies with equal force when a new jury is empaneled for purposes of resentenc-
ing only." Id.
1991]
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss1/12
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Justice Toal disagreed with the majority's reasoning, but con-
curred in the result. She claimed that the majority missed the issue
and created unnecessary and impracticable problems for the sentenc-
ing jury. She argued that because the first jury had already convicted
the defendant of the aggravating crimes, the sentencing jury should be
able to rely on the validity of those convictions. The crucial issue in
Riddle, Justice Toal contended, was not whether the defendant had in
fact committed the aggravating crimes but "whether the murder was
committed 'while in the commission of" the aggravating crimes.90
If the convictions are not admissible at the resentencing, then the
jury will be required to determine whether the defendant committed
the murder while in the commission of the statutory aggravating
crimes and whether the defendant is guilty of the statutory aggravating
crimes at all.91 The requirement that the sentencing jury determine
whether the defendant committed the aggravating crimes before it may
consider whether to sentence the defendant to death diminishes the
importance of the convicting jury's verdict. If, as Justice Toal advo-
cates, the sentencing jury were allowed to consider the defendant's
convictions for aggravating crimes as evidence of aggravating circum-
stances, the sentencing jury would still have to determine whether the
murder was committed during the commission of crimes constituting
aggravating circumstances and, if so, whether to recommend the death
penalty.9 2 This procedure would still meet the requirements of the
statute.
Because of the finality of the death sentence, the legislature en-
acted precautionary measures to avoid improper sentencing.93 Section
16-3-20 of the South Carolina Code relaxes the evidentiary require-
ments during the sentencing phase to permit the sentencing authority
to consider evidence that the convicting jury could not hear when de-
termining guilt. The sentencing authority may use this evidence to re-
turn a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death even when ag-
gravating circumstances exist.9 4 Furthermore, and perhaps most
90. Riddle II, 301 S.C. at 73, 389 S.E.2d at 668 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
20(C)(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (emphasis added by Justice Toal)).
91. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
92. Id. § 16-3-20(C).
93. Hubbard, Burry, & Widener, A "Meaningful" Basis for the Death Penalty:
The Practice, Constitutionality, and Justice of Capital Punishment in South Carolina,
34 S.C.L. REv. 391, 414 (1982).
94. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). The legislature also en-
acted a variety of procedural and substantive safeguards to guide sentencing decisions.
Hubbard, Burry, & Widener, supra note 93, at 415; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (evidence concerning a statutory aggravating circumstance is
not admissible unless the state notified the defendant of the evidence in writing prior to
the trial).
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importantly, the legislature created a bias toward life imprisonment by
requiring as a condition to imposing the death penalty that the state
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance existed during the commission of the murder.9 5
What the legislature did not intend in enacting section 16-3-20(C),
however, was to create a means for the defendant to require the state
to prove that which has already been proven and affirmed on appeal.
"Under the majority's theory, the State would be required to retry its
case in regard to the charges of burglary and robbery and, therefore, to
establish the appellant's guilt twice."9 When the defendant has al-
ready been found guilty of other crimes constituting aggravating cir-
cumstances in the guilt phase, the focus in the sentencing phase should
be on whether the defendant committed those crimes while in the com-
mission of the murder. By allowing defendants, in effect, to retry their
cases after they have been convicted and the convictions have been
affirmed on appeal, the supreme court is permitting murderers to ma-
nipulate a system that already has a strong bias against the death
penalty.
Lisa Gray Youngblood
V. ANCIENT DOCUMENTS EXCEPTION TO THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY
RECOGNIZED
The South Carolina common law of evidence has long recognized
the ancient documents rule of authenticity9 Whether South Carolina
also has recognized the ancient documents exception to the hearsay
rule is less clear.9 8 In Johnson v. Pritchard" the South Carolina Court
of Appeals explicitly adopted the rule that "duly authenticated ancient
95. Hubbard, Burry, & Widener, supra note 93, at 416.
96. Riddle II, 301 S.C. 68, 73, 389 S.E.2d 665, 668 (Toal, J., concurring).
97. See Thompson v. Brannon, 14 S.C. 542, 551 (1881) ("Deeds and other writings
over thirty years old may be offered without formal proof of their execution, if the wit-
nesses be dead, where there is no doubt as to their genuineness, and when they come
from the proper custody.").
98. Compare W. REISER, A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WrrH
SOUTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE LAW 70 (4th ed. 1990) ("There is apparently no Supreme
Court or statutory authority in South Carolina for an ancient documents exception to
the hearsay rule.") with Johnson v. Pritchard, 395 S.E.2d 191, 198 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990)
(Sanders, J., concurring) ("[O]ur Supreme Court, almost sixty-five years ago, recognized
without qualification, a rule permitting the introduction of documents more than thirty
years old as ancient documents.") (citing Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Searson, 137 S.C.
468, 135 S.E. 567 (1926)).
99. 395 S.E.2d 191 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
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documents of 30 years or more constitute an exception to the hearsay
rule.,,loo
The ancient documents at issue in this case consisted of a letter
from an attorney, dated July 3, 1937, a certificate of title, and two affi-
davits. The affidavits stated that William F. Pritchard purchased and
possessed certain property, which included the property in dispute.
The plaintiffs, heirs of William F. Pritchard, offered these documents
to prove Pritchard's title to the property.
The defendants raised a hearsay objection when the plaintiffs
sought to introduce these documents. The master-in-equity admitted
the documents and cited the ancient documents exception to the hear-
say rule. The defendants made no objection to the authenticity of the
documents, and a witness read portions of the documents into the rec-
ord without further objection.
Because the defendants made no objection to the authenticity of
the documents, the court of appeals held that the documents were
properly authenticated ancient documents. 101 The court pointed out
that Rule 803(16) of the Federal Rules of Evidence0 2 admits recitals in
ancient documents as an exception to the hearsay rule.1 0 3 Moreover,
thirty-three states have adopted this provision.10' The court of appeals
held that South Carolina should follow this majority.10 5
In his concurring opinion Chief Judge Sanders argued that South
Carolina has recognized the ancient documents exception to the hear-
say rule for almost sixty-five years. 08 Relying on Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad v. Searson,'0 7 Chief Judge Sanders stated, "Nothing about
the language used by the Supreme Court in that case suggests the an-
cient documents rule in this state relates only to authenticity."'10 8
Judge Cureton also concurred in the result, but did not agree with
the decision to adopt the ancient documents exception to the hearsay
rule.10 9 Instead, he would have affirmed the master's decision to admit
the documents because the defendants failed to preserve their hearsay
objection. Judge Cureton pointed out that South Carolina's ancient
100. Id. at 196.
101. Id. at 195.
102. FED. R. Evw. 803(16).
103. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d at 195.
104. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WmNSTmN's EVMENCE 803(16)[02] (1990 &
Supp. 1990).
105. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d at 196.
106. Id. at 198.
107. 137 S.C. 468, 135 S.E. 567 (1926).
108. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d at 198.
109. Id.
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documents rule admits muniments of title... for their content."' He
noted, however, that the documents at issue did not qualify as muni-
ments of title.
1
1
2
Rule 803(16) of the Federal Rules of Evidence admits documents
over twenty years old as an exception to the hearsay rule."' However,
the document must meet the requisites of authentication: it must be
written, produced from proper custody, and unsuspicious in appear-
ance.J 4 Ancient documents are reliable because the age of the docu-
ment insures that the declarant made the statement prior to the con-
troversy in litigation. Thus, the declarant had no motivation to
misrepresent at that time."5 The ancient documents exception to the
hearsay rule is not without limits: "Excepting the contents of an an-
cient document from hearsay just admits the evidence; it does not cast
it in bronze." ''
Whether South Carolina had previously adopted an ancient docu-
ments exception to the hearsay rule remains unclear. As Judge Cureton
pointed out, the South Carolina ancient documents rule has long ad-
mitted properly authenticated ancient deeds and other muniments of
title to prove ownership." In Goings v. Mitchell"" the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the admission of a deed and plat to prove
ownership of a disputed parcel of land. The court stated: "The deed
was competent. And so was the plat purporting to have been made in
1851. The plat was of age, and could speak for itself; there was no need
to prove who made it or when it was made, for it was in the plaintiffs'
possession. ' ' 9
The confusion about the South Carolina ancient documents rule
arises when courts admit muniments of title that arguably contain as-
sertions barred by the hearsay rule. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v.
Searson"20 the South Carolina Supreme Couft allowed the admission
110. Muniments of title are "[t]he instruments of writing and written evidences
which the owner of lands, possessions, or inheritances has, by which he is enabled to
defend the title of his estate." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1019 (6th ed. 1990).
111. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d at 198 (citing Goings v. Mitchell, 110 S.C. 380, 96 S.E. 612
(1918)).
112. Id.
113. FED. R. EvD. 803(16).
114. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 104, 803(16)[01]; see Johnson, 395
S.E.2d at 195.
115. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d at 195.
116. J. THAMES & W. VON ZHAREN, A GUME TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 58
(2d rev. 1987).
117. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
118. 110 S.C. 380, 96 S.E. 612 (1918).
119. Id. at 382, 96 S.E. at 613.
120. 137 S.C. 468, 135 S.E. 567 (1926).
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into evidence of an ancient map that showed a railroad right-of-way. 12'
The map was a muniment of title, similar to a plat. Arguably, the
markings on the map constituted assertions of the boundaries of the
right-of-way. Because the map was offered to prove the locations of
those boundaries, it should have been barred from introduction into
evidence by the hearsay rule. However, the admission of the map in
Searson did not necessarily create an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Searson court merely applied the established exception for muni-
ments of title; the court probably did not intend to create a new excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.
In Johnson the affidavits alone would not allow an owner to de-
fend title to his estate; therefore, the documents do not constitute mu-
niments of title.1 22 Because the affidavits contained hearsay, they were
not admissible without the ancient documents exception to the hearsay
rule.
Until the Supreme Court of South Carolina rules otherwise, John-
son makes clear that the court of appeals will recognize an ancient doc-
uments exception to the hearsay rule. South Carolina thereby joins the
majority of states that admit authentic ancient documents into evi-
dence for their content.
Julia C. Archer
121. Id. at 493, 135 S.E. at 574.
122. Johnson v. Pritchard, 395 S.E.2d 191, 198 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (Cureton, J.,
concurring).
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